Germany has long been viewed as *the* model for reckoning with past atrocities—particularly through its atonement for the Holocaust and the creation of a public space steeped in historical reflection and contrition. Unlike Italy, for example, Germany has made its national memory a central pillar of its identity. However, this commitment to remembrance is now producing some unforeseen challenges.

For example, the legacy of the Holocaust makes critical public discussions about the actions of the Israeli government very difficult. At the same time, antisemitism, which has never fully disappeared, is once again on the rise.

In November 2023, members of the far-right party AfD were caught in a secret meeting discussing a “master plan” for the mass deportation of foreigners and “non-assimilated” Germans. When the news broke in January 2024, over a million people took to the streets across Germany to protest extremism and AfD’s ideology.

While the widespread mobilization in defense of democracy is heartening, it’s equally concerning that a party like AfD—which would have been considered taboo just a decade ago—has not only gained traction but may even be poised for government in the near future.

So, how did AfD become the third-largest political force in Germany? And is the country’s democratic cordon sanitaire strong enough to hold?

This interview delves into these questions and more with political expert Manès Weisskircher.

Enjoy the read.

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1) Given your extensive research on Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), including your recently published edited volume, let’s discuss the latest developments. In September 2024, AfD achieved significant electoral victories in the state elections of Thuringia, Saxony, and Brandenburg. What do you consider the key factors driving the party’s success in these regions, particularly in the former East Germany? Are there broader social, political, or economic trends contributing to this outcome?

There are multiple reasons for the strength of AfD in Germany’s east. Economic insecurity is higher in the region, eastern Germans are more negative towards immigration, and dissatisfaction with representation and the functioning of democracy is particularly high. The multiple analyses of the eastern German context, including my own, usually link these differences to the west to the GDR heritage and the neoliberal transformation period after 1989/90. And indeed, highlighting the specificities is important.

However, such a perspective also has two shortcomings: First, observers tend to overlook that AfD has recently performed quite well in western Germany too. Far-right party politics is not only an eastern German problem. Second, the uniqueness of the eastern German context should not be exaggerated given that the far right is as strong as AfD in the east in many other European countries. What is special about eastern Germany, unfortunately, is the high prevalence of far-right violence. My colleagues at C-REX, especially Jacob Aasland Ravndal, have shown that there is an overall trend of declining severe far-right violence in western Europe. Germany, however, is an exception.

2) In 2013, when it was founded, AfD was considered a “party of professors”. It looked like it was targeting conservative, middle-class, well-educated men who disliked the economic policy of Germany during the Great Recession and appreciated a strongly Eurosceptic message. How did we get to the current extremism in just a decade?

Perhaps an electorally successful far-right party in Germany could only have started as a “party of professors”. Given the strong cordon sanitaire, the classical far-right parties were usually a collection of weirdos and extremists. Following David Art’s famous argument, it makes sense that these parties had only limited appeal and could easily be dealt with.

This was different with the neoliberal professors in AfD’s early days, which combined a respectable profession (well, as an academic I have to say this!) with hegemonic economic beliefs.

Like other western European parties that did not start as far-right parties such as the SVP in Switzerland or some Scandinavian anti-tax parties, the new AfD provided an opportunity for far-right actors.  It only took them two years to take the new party over.

3) Would you agree that AfD was initially a centre-right party that first evolved into a classic populist radical right party and eventually turned into an extreme right party? Or is it better to use the term ‘far right’ given the blurred line between radicalism and extremism?

With Sabine Volk, we wrote an article and a chapter in which we doubt whether the distinction between the radical and the extreme right – at least in the context of western Europe – can be meaningfully operationalized. After all, by now many actors formally adhere to the idea of democracy, including those often regarded as extremists.

We think it is analytically more fruitful to identify specific extremist elements within the far-right’s ideology: First, the delegitimization of actual democratic institutions despite formal adherence to democracy (‘Eco-dictatorship’ or vilification of parliamentarism) and second, hate speech towards political opponents and minorities.

We think it is analytically more fruitful to identify the more specific extremist elements of far-right ideology: First, the delegitimization of actual democratic institutions despite formal adherence to democracy (‘Eco-dictatorship’ or vilification of parliamentarism) and second, hate speech towards political opponents and minorities.

To us, emphasizing these elements is more precise – and operationalizable – than educated guesses about whether a political player is still ‘pro-‘ or already ‘anti-democratic’.

4) What are the links between AfD and the most important social movements in Germany in the last years such as PEGIDA and the anti-Corona Protests of Querdenken? Does AfD manage to exploit these movements for its own political purposes?

Many AfD politicians try to pursue movement-party strategies, staging demonstrations themselves while trying to ride the wave of successful protest. Initially, this strategy was still controversial within the party, but now there is hardly any open opposition. While PEGIDA is soon celebrating its tenth anniversary, the group is no longer a force but rather a symbol of a successful protest wave from the past that far-right players, such as AfD, dream of repeating.

During the COVID pandemic, marching together with Querdenken worked out quite well, but some other AfD efforts of staging street protests, for example in the context of the war in Ukraine, have failed. Still, far-right parties in other countries may learn from AfD’s approach. For example the FPÖ, traditionally distant from street protestors, has changed course: Its leader Herbert Kickl has given several speeches at Querdenken protests during the pandemic.

5) The far right had four waves since 1945. The fourth one started at the beginning of the 21^st century and is characterized by the progressive normalization and mainstreaming of far-right parties and discourses. However, don’t you think that in recent years the far right has surged to such a level of popularity and power that we could start talking of fifth wave? If this is the case, what would be the features of the new wave compared to the previous ones?

In my book, I speculate about what a potential fifth wave of far-right politics in Europe and beyond may look like. While Germany is an exception, elsewhere normalization brought far-right parties into government, for example in my home country of Austria. So, what new developments might the future then bring? For me, two features stand out.

First, far-right parties increasingly go beyond their core issues of immigration, law and order, and opposition against European integration. Instead, many pursue oppositional strategies on any salient issue, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or climate change, trying to exploit the complexities of crises. Here, my argument is similar to the one made by Michael Hansen and Jonathan Olsen, who consider AfD a beneficiary of crises.

Second, a key new development of far-right politics in western Europe is an increasing reliance on movement-party strategies – a development we have already seen in diverse regions such as Northern America, Latin America, or Central and Eastern Europe.

6) Given the recent electoral success of AfD, it seems almost impossible for the established parties to maintain a cordon sanitaire. Do you think that AfD will be normalized and become a permanent feature of the German party system?

Like in other western European countries, the far right in Germany will likely remain a significant player. However, the cordon sanitaire remains relatively stable. In the context of this year’s regional elections, the CDU has stayed away from cooperating with AfD. At least in the short term, the new idiosyncratic party led by Sahra Wagenknecht, former leader of Die Linke, seems to provide an alternative coalition option. This is one of the reasons why those eastern CDU members who were favorable to cooperating with AfD did not have much sway this autumn. Moreover, the federal CDU leadership has strongly rejected coalition formation with AfD.

Nevertheless, CDU-AfD cooperation is increasing in local legislatures in the east. Moreover, the new regional government coalitions with the Wagenknecht party might prove unstable. That’s why we don’t know what the mid-term future will bring – but given that CDU leader Merz wants to win next year’s federal election, I don’t expect the party to change course in the short term.

Despite the local exceptions, the CDU’s distance from AfD is special: Just think about other western European countries. Even in Portugal and Sweden, countries where new far-right parties have emerged in recent years, the established right has already accepted cooperation with the far right.

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Dr. Manès Weisskircher leads the BMBF-funded research group REXKLIMA (Far-right politics versus climate action?) at the Institute of Political Science, TU Dresden. Moreover, he is affiliated to the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo, and the Center for Civil Society Research, Berlin Social Science Center (WZB). He holds a PhD from the European University Institute (2019). 

His research has been published in journals such as the European Journal of Political Research, Party Politics, Political Studies, Government & Opposition, Social Movement Studies, German Politics, Politics and Governance, Sociological Perspectives. He is one of the authors of ‘Gains and Losses: How Protestors Win and Lose’ (Oxford University Press). He is editor of the volume “Contemporary Germany and the Fourth Wave of Far-Right Politics” (Routledge) and the Special Issue “New Contentious Politics. Civil Society, Social Movements, and the Polarisation of German Politics” (German Politics, with Swen Hutter).