The impact of populists in power is always a much-debated topic. There are the apocalyptics, who predict locusts and other misfortunes every time a populist comes to power. Then there are those like Jasmin Sarah König, who analyse the data, observe the context, and draw conclusions by considering the pros and cons, situations and characteristics of the actors involved, and the systems in which these processes occur.
For example, Jasmin argues that when they are part of coalition governments, populist parties cannot simply implement the policies they want. When there are proper political checks and balances – not only through judicial institutions but through other political parties or organizations – possible negative consequences of populism can be contained.
She studied in detail whether the legislation initiated by the populist radical right FPÖ is unconstitutional more often than the laws initiated by other parties. The findings suggest that the FPÖ did not transgress constitutional boundaries more often than other parties because populist radical right parties can be forced to moderate when they need to compromise with a coalition partner.
Because, in the end, our constitutions are neither solid nor weak: they are just paper. It’s up to us to protect them.
Enjoy the read…
1) The literature on populism is like the universe: constantly expanding…or so I wrote (citing a song from Offlaga Disco Pax) in the introduction of The Populism Interviews. Is there an author who inspired and motivated you to study this thriving topic?
The first book I read about a somewhat related topic was about right-wing extremist groups and their networks around Europe. It was written by a German journalist, Andreas Speit, and it first sparked my interest in studying the far right. Only later did I transition from studying the far right to writing about populism.
2) When I started researching populism over a decade ago, populists in power were a rarity. I grew up during Berlusconism, so obviously for me there was nothing strange with a populist in power, but the rest of the world was different. Nowadays, populists are in power in several European countries. In your opinion, what are the main causes, and, on the other hand, what will be the consequences of this ‘institutionalisation of populism’ in the long term?
The main causes are not my main research area, so I can only build upon what I have read over the past few years. Two reasons for the institutionalization immediately come to my mind: our societies are becoming more diverse, or at least more diverse people can participate nowadays. I would argue that this has led to a fragmentation of many party systems. This of course gives more power to populist parties because it becomes harder to build coalitions without them.
But I think there also has been a normalization of not only populist but also far-right politics. The more mainstream parties take up their demands and rhetoric, the more often they are in government, and the more their stances are normalized. I think this is particularly problematic when we look at far-right, nativist parties and populist parties that are also authoritarian.
Considering the consequences of the institutionalization of populism, I think we need to look at the political systems. Our paper showed that in coalition governments, populist parties cannot simply implement the policies they want.
Bolivia is often mentioned as a case in which populist parties in power improved democratic quality, for example through the new 2009 constitution in which indigenous nations and peoples received more rights. However, the populist government party did not have the necessary majority in Congress to implement all the changes it wanted. This constitution was the result of very intense negotiations between the populist government, and civil society – through a constitutional assembly. A process in which the government needs to compromise is less likely to lead to executive aggrandizement.
Evo Morales, president of Bolivia between 2006 and 2019.
This example shows that if there are political checks and balances – not only through judicial institutions but through other political parties or organizations – we can contain possible negative consequences of populism. Unfortunately, this doesn’t mean that Morales’ government did not have any negative effects on democracy. Before the constitutional reform, the administration had already forced judges to retire in order to be able to take control of the courts (Helmke et al. gave a good overview of this).
In cases where populists come into power in a presidential system with strong executive power and possibly a majority in both chambers, the situation is different. In these cases, the impact depends on the populist party: if it holds somewhat authoritarian preferences, we will likely see democratic erosion. If it emphasizes the popular sovereignty of the people, we might see the implementation of more direct democratic measures.
3) In your work, you focus on Austria from 1980 to 2021 and analyse the role of right-wing populist parties such as FPÖ or BZÖ. Did you find any worrying effect of populists in power on liberal democracy and constitutional limitations?
We analysed all judicial review cases from 1980-2021 to see whether legislation initiated by the populist FPÖ is unconstitutional more often than the laws initiated by other parties. In this case, of course, this could have been driven not only by the FPÖ’s populism but also by their far-right ideology. However, our findings suggest they did not transgress constitutional boundaries more often than other parties. The key is that they governed with the mainstream ÖVP, who strongly communicated before their first coalition with the FPÖ that they’ll need to stay under the “constitutional arch”. In the Kurz government from 2017 to 2019, we did not see more unconstitutional laws but in the laws that were invalidated, very large parts were declared unconstitutional.
Of course, this does not mean that right-wing populists in government do not have any negative consequences for democracy, but they can be forced to moderate when they need to compromise with a coalition partner.
4) Since your study focuses on right-wing populism, I wonder whether you would obtain similar findings, for example, in countries such as Spain or Greece when left-wing populist parties were in power. Do you think that it is populism per se that when in power, affects liberal democracy? Or maybe it is other characteristics of these parties that we should consider?
We definitely need to consider other aspects as well. The party’s host ideology has a massive impact – particularly far-right parties flirting with authoritarian ideals, such as the German AfD, are much more likely to have a negative impact on democratic quality. The interview with Giorgos Katsambekis very much resonated with me in this regard. I think when we look at the effects of populists on democracy, we often miss that these are frequently but not always parties on the verge of authoritarianism. Crucially, it is often authoritarianism, rather than populism, that drives their actions in government.
In some cases, populism is only used as an opportunistic tool, while some parties are deeply (ideologically) populist. Think of Orbán: Fidesz’ leader uses a populist rhetoric but he has not included citizens in the drafting of the constitution, nor has he implemented more possibilities for citizens to participate. SYRIZA is a counter-example. In 2016, they proposed a constitutional reform that would have strengthened direct democratic mechanisms. They planned to include citizens throughout discussion events in all regions of Greece and allow citizens to submit proposals for amendments through a website. The constitutional reform was not implemented because the government prioritized other issues (such as the financial crisis). Due to the lack of a majority in parliament, it would have been hard to actually implement the reform. Nonetheless, the reform proposal is a good example of a party trying to implement the populist ideology in a very different way compared to Orbán. If you are interested in the case, this paper gives a great overview of the reform attempt.
5) Since the publication of your work, have you noticed any examples of populists in power going against the constitutional limitations in their countries? I think, for example, about Italy where PM Giorgia Meloni is trying to change the constitution to give more powers to…the PM.
Israel is an extremely interesting example, because the government under Netanyahu has implemented a law restricting the Supreme Court’s right to judicial review. This is exactly what we would expect from a populist government: taking power from non-majoritarian institutions – there are indeed also quite a few political and legal theorists who argue that judicial review is quite undemocratic. However, what is really interesting about the case is the public’s reaction. So many people went to the streets in Israel in support of the Supreme Court. This is one of the main assumptions in judicial politics that judicial independence will be respected because the people hold the judiciary in high regard and will punish any attack on judicial power in the next election. In reality, this happens rarely. In early 2024, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled (a first part of) the judicial reform as unconstitutional. That they decided to do this and that at least parts of the government have spoken out in favour of respecting the decision might also be due to the people’s protests. As far as I know, the Israeli government has not yet agreed on how to proceed and whether the decision should be accepted.
Italy is another relevant case – Meloni proposes something that people often connect with populist constitutional change: aggregating power in the executive. But, again, I wonder whether this is driven by populism or by authoritarianism. If it were really motivated by Meloni’s populist ideology, shouldn’t we also see a strengthening of participation mechanisms?
More generally, I have found in my research that populist governments don’t change the constitution more often than other governments, even though we could expect this based on the populist ideology.
6) Reversing the line of argument used so far, instead of looking at the effects of populists in power, I would like to ask you about the contrary: what do you think are the effects of power on populists? Are they still populists – and especially anti-elitists – once they are in power, or do they become something else?
I really like what Albertazzi and McDonnell wrote on this. Populists have “one foot in and one foot out” the door when they are in government. In some ways, they will be constrained and will work on being more institutionalized. But, in other ways, they will try to keep their populist electorate happy (for example through their rhetoric). But I think there are always ways to stay anti-elitist when in power, instead of blaming the government, you can blame supranational institutions, high courts, or the opposition.
7) In conclusion, would you say that the growing success of populist parties in Europe will threaten the protection of minority rights, media freedom, the rule of law, and the separation of powers? Or are constitutions solid enough to resist the assault of illiberal forces?
Yes, it is a worrying trend. Not because these parties are populist, but because many of them are far-right and therefore authoritarian. If SYRIZA returned to power, for example, it would not threaten liberal democracy.
Checks and balances are crucial to limit the negative effects of authoritarian populists in power. The presence of two chambers, coalition governments, necessary 2/3 majorities for important constitutional changes, and so on. Of course, this comes with the danger of gridlock…
Our constitutions are neither solid nor weak. They are just paper. It is about how the other parties behave, whether they help authoritarian populists to implement their vision, and how we as citizens respond. Neither our constitution nor our constitutional courts can defend themselves. We are the ones who have to protect them!
What worries me is that trust in institutions is low across many countries, and these levels of trust continue to decrease. According to the Eurobarometer, in many European countries, only 30 to 50% of the population trusts the judiciary. And why would you defend an institution that you do not trust? We need to increase this trust to make our constitutions resilient, the words on paper can’t protect any democracy from dying.
Jasmin is a PhD Candidate in the Research Training Group ‘Collective Decision-Making’ at the University of Hamburg. Her research focuses on how populists and courts interact. Her work has been published in the EJPR and Leviathan. She is passionate about communicating political science through interactive data visualisations.
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